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SYMPOSIUM
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: A TIME OF
CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE

THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE AUTHORITY OF LAW
by Richard S. Kay*
By almost all accounts, the system of international law established
by the European Convention on Human Rights has been successful to a
degree unimaginable when the Convention was signed in 1950. The European Court of Human Rights now routinely issues judgments finding
the states party to the Convention to have defaulted in their obligations
under it. Those judgments, sometimes touching on difficult and contro* William J. Brennan Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. This is a
revised version of introductory remarks delivered at a panel on the International Protection of
Human Rights at the Conference on Human Rights in Theory and Practice held in Budapest,
Hungary on March 19, 1993.
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versial issues that might have been thought to lie at the center of state
sovereignty, are, almost equally routinely, honored by the respondent
states who both pay the compensation ordered by the Court and also
adjust their laws and governmental practices to conform to the Court's
interpretations.'
Now the European human rights system stands on the verge of an
extraordinary expansion. With the fading of the totalitarian regimes in
Central and Eastern Europe many of their democratic replacements
are seeking admission to the economic, social and political institutions
of Western Europe. While these institutions take many forms, the first
step towards association with almost all of them involves membership
in the Council of Europe. A tacit understanding has developed that
membership in the Council is to be open only to those states who engage speedily to ratify the Human Rights Convention and, moreover, to
recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of European Court of Human
Rights and the right of individuals to initiate complaints alleging
human rights violations before the European Commission on Human
Rights. 2 Given the effectiveness of the Convention in Western Europe
in providing well-defined and progressive standards of state conduct, its
extension to these new democracies is a hopeful event.
By the same token, an extraordinary expansion of this kind is sure
to pose serious challenges to the continued efficacy of the system. It
may be useful in evaluating those challenges to re-examine, in very
general terms, what has made the European human rights system work
so well. And then, having extracted the factors that have contributed to
its success, to see how future developments are likely to affect those
factors in the new, larger legal universe.
The most singular aspect of the success of the European Convention on Human Rights and the institutions created by it has been its
acceptance as a genuine system of law. The existence of any legal system depends on the presence of certain indispensable political and social preconditions. Since those preconditions determine what law is,
1.
see P.

& RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW xlii-xlv (1990). But
& G.J.H. VAN HOOD, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
RIGHTS 616-45 (1990) (suggesting there may be a growing resistance to the Court's
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judgments).
2. These steps are optional for parties otherwise agreeing to the Convention. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221,
E.T.S. 5, U.K.T.S. 71 (1953) (signed at Rome Nov. 4, 1950; entered into force Sept..3, 1953)
[hereinafter European Convention], Arts. 25 and 46.
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they cannot themselves be the product of law.$ For an advanced legal
system, moreover, it is not sufficient that there be social acceptance
merely of standards of conduct. Such a system depends, as well, on the
acceptance of what H.L.A. Hart called "secondary rules."" These are
rules about the creation and operation of the "primary rules" directly
governing conduct. With respect to the questions of interest here, this
means acceptance of the legitimate authority of recognized institutions,
working according to specified procedures, to decide what is and what
is not appropriate conduct, to translate those decisions into articulated
rules, to interpret those rules and to enforce them. Once this kind of
acceptance exists, the actions of these agencies are treated as authoritative.5 This political acceptance of certain authoritative lawmakers and
law-appliers amounts to a kind of pre-commitment to be governed by
the judgments of these agencies. We agree, at least insofar as our actions are concerned, to suspend any critical re-examination of those
judgments.' Put yet another way, any doubts we may have about a
particular exercise of legal authority are swamped by our prior, and
more basic, adherence to the legitimacy of that authority.
The success of the European human rights system seems best explained in exactly these terms. The remarkable thing about it is not so
much the widespread agreement on the very general standards of conduct expressed in the substantive provisions of the Convention. These
principles have, after all, long been incorporated into a widely-shared
European political morality. Far more extraordinary, in light of the historic sensitivity of modern states to any perceived incursions on their
3. See H. L. A. HART. THE CONCEPT OF LAW 111-13 (1961). 1 have discussed this phenomenon in the particular context of constitutional law in Richard S. Kay, PreconstitutionalRules, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981) and Richard S. Kay, Comparative Constitutional Fundamentals, 6
CONN. J. INT'L L. 445 (1991).
4. See HART, supra note 3, at 78-79.
5. The phenomenon of the acceptance of law-making institutions, of course, cannot, in practice, be as clearly divorced from substantive standards as this summary might suggest. A set of
substantive limitations on the kinds of legal rules the law-making agencies may promulgate may
thus be an essential ingredient of their legitimacy.
6. There may, of course, be an intermediate position in which the legal system, as a whole, is
respected, but particular results are so objectionable as to justify resistance. Such an attitude may
manifest itself in individual acts of civil disobedience. In these circumstances, as Tamis F6ldesi
has noted, a person can be "an enemy to a certain legal measure and a friend of the constitution
at the same time." Tdms F61desi, Civil Disobedience: The "Step-Brother" of Civil Rights, in 32
ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS SCIENTIARUM BUDAPESTINENSIS DE ROLANDO EOTVOS NOMINATE 23, 26
(1991). The extent to which a fragile legal system can be maintained in the face of instances of
civil disobedience is a particularly important question for the regime of the European Convention
on Human Rights. See id. at 31.
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sovereignty, has been the continued acceptance of the legitimate authority of the institutions it has created - and especially the European
Court of Human Rights - to make binding interpretations and applications of European Human Rights law in concrete cases. The Court,
in its judgments, often pronounces on matters of great controversy.
That its decisions have been so uniformly respected cannot be attributed to their often quite disputable results, nor to the sometimes uneven
logic of the reasons the Court gives for them. Rather they are accepted
now, in largest part, simply because the Court has earned acceptance
as the authoritative interpreter of binding legal rules.
If this description of the legal authority of the European human
rights system is correct, we are in a-position to return to the original
question posed. What are the principal threats posed to that system by
the expected rapid expansion of its field of application? This analysis
suggests that we ought to be most worried about those aspects of the
extension which might subvert the fragile social, political and psychological attitudes that underlie the recognition of the authority-of the
organs of the Convention, and especially the Court, to make binding
pronouncements of law. Three factors of this kind stand out.
First, the expansion of the European human rights system will
bring within its scope societies and individuals with different histories,
different traditions and, almost certainly, different basic social or political ethics about the values that underlie many of the Convention
rights.7 More exactly, there is a wide range of views in the world about
the relative roles of social and individual decisionmaking. While the
jurisprudence of the Convention has recognized this inevitable variation
through the application of a margin of appreciation allowed to individual states,8 that margin has not, and if the Convention is to constrain at
all, could not, expand indefinitely. 9 It would be a mistake, of course, to
discount the significant historic commonalities of European legal history. Certainly, in many of the new democracies there are rich, if more
7. See David Seymour, The Extension of the European Convention on Human Rights to Central and Eastern Europe: Prospects and Risks, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 243, 245-47 (1993); Henricus
Schermers, International Human Rights in the European Community and in the Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: An Overview, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 313, 319-21 (1993).
8. See JANIS & KAY, supra note I, at 244-58; Ronald St. John MacDonald, The Margin of
Appreciation in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AT THE TIME OF ITS CODIFICATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERTO AGO 187 (1982).
9. See, e.g., Olsson v. Sweden, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32 (1988) (stating that the
Court's review "is not limited to ascertaining whether a respondent State exercised its discretion
reasonably, carefully and in good faith.").
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recently suppressed, traditions of legality. Nevertheless, the variety of
deeply rooted social attitudes relevant to the European human rights
system promises to be greater after the adherence of the states of Central and Eastern Europe than anything the system has encountered up
to now. Therefore, more judgments of the Court may end up being
disturbing, if not offensive, in more of the places where the Convention
is to govern. The more such serious objections to the results of Court
decisions occur, the harder it will be for people to maintain that suspension of substantive judgment in favor of the legitimacy of the authority of the Convention organs that we have identified as central to
the Convention's success as a system of law.' 0
Second, the enlargement of the field of application of the Convention will have to be accompanied by a proportional sharing of the personnel duties of the system with individuals from the new states. The
ranks of judges, commissioners and staff will now be fuller and will be
comprised of people of a larger number of nationalities. The mere increase in the size of the adjudicative and administrative machinery
will, itself, create obvious problems. The prospect of a thirty-five or
forty member Court and Commission has already stirred an active discussion about structural change in the system." Beyond this problem,
however, as the staffing of the system becomes more diverse, the decisions generated by that system may come to be viewed with more suspicion throughout Europe. To be sure, such increased diversity may be
expected to enrich the decision-making process. But it may also aggravate the natural resistance to important domestic policies being regulated from outside as the decision-makers are perceived as increasingly
"foreign." The essential characteristic of a legal system, as I have described it, is an implicit and widely held trust that, in the long run, the
legal institutions will act in the general welfare. It is regrettably, but
undeniably, true that such trust is more readily ceded to individuals
who are most similar to the population involved in language, culture
and tradition.
Finally, the extension of the European human rights system to
Central and Eastern Europe may work a change in the dominant
human rights themes that concern that system. Put briefly, there is a
risk that the activities of the institutions of the Convention may be in10. See Seymour, supra note 7 at 245-47.
11. See Seymour, supra note 7 at 255-59; Schermers, supra note 7 at 317-18; Michael
O'Boyle, Right to Speak and Associate Under Strasbourg Case-Law With Reference to Eastern
and Central Europe, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 263, 266-67 (1993).
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creasifigly directed to issues that appear more political than legal.
First of all, the human rights concerns in the newly adhering
states may focus on different matters and the Convention itself may be
expected to be revised and amplified to deal with those concerns. The
status of national, ethnic and religious minorities has already become
tragically associated with the abuse of human rights in this part of Europe. In response to these developments, the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe has recommended a new protocol to the Convention dealing with the rights of such minorities. 2 The very question
of the character of nationality and citizenship is, for similar reasons,
likely to become more prominent, as are the associated questions of the
rights of immigrants and refugees. 13 While it is easy to conclude that
gross mistreatment of individuals on the basis of race, religion or
ethnicity should be characterized as violations of human rights, a general recognition of the rights of groups to some kind of self-defining
and self-perpetuating status presents practical and conceptual problems
of the most difficult kind.
Furthermore, even more familiar rights, such as the rights of expression and association, in Articles 10 and 11 may appear in a new
and more perplexing light. The idea that the operation of the press may
proceed independently of the interests of the state may be a curious one
in some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, even after the
institution of democratic governments. Controversy over the independence of the media has emerged in a number of these countries.1 5 Casting these controversies into the form of human rights issues may involve the determination of questions which, like those related to
minority rights, seem to present choices which appear far more political
than they do in the West where the separation of state and media is a
more familiar concept. 6
12. See Report on an Additional Protocol on the Rights of Minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights, Eur. Parl. Ass., Doc. No. 6742 (1993).
13. See Tamds Fb1desi, The Right to Move and its Achilles' Heel, the Right to Asylum, 8
CONN. J. INT'L L. 289 (1993). The Fourth Protocol to the European Convention protects the
rights of movement into, out of and within states, but only for nationals of those states.
14. See Carol Weisbrod, Minorities and Diversities: The "Remarkable Experiment" of the
League of Nations, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 357 (1993).
15. See, e.g., Ken Kasriel, Hungary's 'Media War' Curbs Press Freedom, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR. Jan. 11, 1993, at 5; Ben Sullivan, Czechoslavakia: Press Protests As Slovakia Tightens Media Control, Inter Press Service, Sept. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES File; Peter Humphrey, Romania's Independent Press Claims Government Strangling It,
REUTERS, May 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File.
16. See O'Boyle, supra note 11 at 268-7 1; Gibor Kardos, Freedom of Speech in the Time of
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Both the potential emphasis on new kinds of rights and the recasting of established rights, threaten to undermine the critical perception
of the institutions of the European human rights system as dealing with
the application of pre-existing law and not with matters of fresh policy.
The questions which the application of the abstract rights will present
to the European Commission and Court will much less often be defensible as mere elaboration of a prior legal right. The decisions of these
agencies may then look much more like the exercise of raw political
choice. To the extent this is so, their special legitimacy as authoritative
appliers of law will be reduced, not merely when these new kinds of
rights are at issue, but in general. 17 After all, there seems to be no
reason why the merely political judgments of a group of foreigners,
debating and deciding far from home, should be preferred to those of
the safer and more familiar legal authorities at home.
Of course, I do not wish to be understood as arguing that the expansion of the reach of the European Convention on Human Rights, is,
for the reasons mentioned, something to be feared rather than welcomed. It is plain that the well-developed and deeply-rooted traditions
of legality in Central and Eastern Europe were not extinguished, even
by fifty years of totalitarianism. As I mentioned at the outset, it is reasonable to hope that the application of the standards of the Convention
will be a natural and helpful part of the process whereby democracy,
respect for human rights and the rule of law become firmly established
in these countries. Indeed, the risks I have outlined may pale in comparison with the doubts that might have been entertained by sober realists in 1950 as to the effect of the Convention on the original parties.
The extraordinary development of that system provides a cautionary
lesson for the most committed skeptics.
That development, may, in fact, provide a useful model for the
manner in which the Convention system should be applied to the new
states. That system, it will be recalled, was largely inactive for the first
twenty or so years of its existence. Only slowly did it begin to take on
more and more controversial claims.1 8 It seems likely that it was exactly this gradual, almost imperceptible, growth that facilitated its reception in the societies on which it had an impact. This experience suggests that the most prudent course in the application of the Convention
Transition, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 525, 525-32 (1993).
17. See AndrAs B. Baka, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of
Minorities Under International Law, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 227, 232, 241-42 (1993).
18. See Janis & Kay, supra note 1, at 93-95.
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to the new democracies is necessarily a restrained and deliberate one.
As I have mentioned, it is now understood that the price of admission
to the Council of Europe includes a clear understanding that the applicant state will ratify the Convention and, significantly, that it will,
within a fairly short period, also agree to recognizing the compulsory
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and the right of
individual petition to the Commission. 9 The effect of such full scale,
rapid assimilation of the Convention in these countries would have the
effect of making them subject, quite rapidly and in a specifically enforceable way, to the fully developed and detailed interpretation of the
Convention that has emerged from jurisprudence of the European
Court.2" An attempt to impose these rules at one blow, as it were, may
exacerbate all of the concerns which I have raised. A more cautious
and staged approach, one more closely mirroring the emergence of European human rights law in Western Europe, seems a safer alternative.
This is a time of great hope for the future of government by law.
But we use the word law in a strictly formal sense if we include within
it rules and institutions which are not legitimated by the social consensus which cause those rules and institutions to be respected. The mere
use of legal form can do little to effect social change. The ritual of
ratification is insufficient to constitute the norms and institutions of the
European Human Rights Convention a true and effective system of
law. To rely on the existence of law, in this strictly technical sense, is to
confuse the relative priority of legal and social-political facts. There is
no doubt that legal rules and agencies can themselves affect the values
of a society. But they can do so only gradually and within limits created by the social and cultural environment into which the law is introduced. The effectiveness of law is a function, in large measure, of the
readiness of society to embrace it. By itself, law can do nothing. It can
19. The leeway now being accorded seems designed mainly to permit the state to make the
technical amendments to its law that would bring them generally into conformity with Convention. See O'Boyle, supra note II at 263; Seymour, supra note 7 at 250-52; Schermers, supra note
7 at 321. It does not appear to be intended to allow the more extended period which, I suggest
here, may be needed for more basic political and social adjustment.
20. There is, of course, a built in delay between the time of full ratification and the time when
a state will actually become subject to judgments of the Court. This results from the necessary lag
created by the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies and the time it will take for the
local population, and especially the legal profession, to become aware of the utility of recourse
under the Convention. European Convention, art. 26. See O'Boyle, supra note I I at 265-66. With
respect to the latter point, however, the very prominence of the Convention in Western Europe
may reduce significantly the time in which "European rights consciousness" develops in Eastern
Europe.
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channel, refine and strengthen values and possibilities already embedded in the society. It can aim high, but no higher than the people it
aspires to govern.

